關於國民政府在「九一八事變」後的應對方略，外交交涉與軍事行動二者雖然關係密切，卻不宜混為一談，目前的觀點多由政治與外交的角度切入，忽略了由軍事角度檢視當時軍隊反應的意涵。史料顯示，當張學良在9月19日仍強調「不抵抗主義」時，國民政府主席兼陸海空軍司令蔣中正在9月22日起已經指示他所掌控的軍隊將領，以正當防衛理念對進犯之日軍採取自衛抵抗行動，並在隔日輾轉提醒張學良，面對侵略，要有不惜與倭寇一戰、雖敗猶榮的覺悟。9月23日，國民政府即明確向國人宣告，準備行使自衛權，故10月爆發江橋抗戰之時，東北國軍已經沒有「不抵抗」的問題。後續的錦州、臨榆、熱河與淞滬抗戰，都是在南京國民政府的正當防衛理念下進行的抗日作戰，至於戰場上的戰鬥結果，端視東北國軍的抗敵意志與犧牲決心而定，這主要與張學良的領導統御能力有關。就軍事角度而言，論者有謂，蔣中正直到江橋抗戰時致電嘉勉馬占山，才等於宣示停止不抵抗政策，此論不符史實；另有所謂，國民政府的不抵抗政策拖到「一二八事變」才正式退場，也不正確。

Regarding the study of the "The Mukden Incident", although the Nationalist government's diplomatic representations with Japan are closely related to military operations, they should not be confused with each other. Before clarifying how the Nationalist government dealt with the" the Mukden Incident", we must first recognize Zhang Xueliang's (張學良) role after the "Central Plains War". Historical data show that when Zhang Xueliang emphasized "non-resistance" on September 19, Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) had already issued instructions to his army to use " Right of self-defense" to take self-defense resistance against the invading Japanese army on September 22. The next day, he also Remind Zhang Xueliang to face the enemy's aggression bravely and not hesitate to fight. On the same day, the national government had clearly announced to the Chinese people that it was ready to exercise the right of self-defense. Therefore, since the day when the" Nenjiang Bridge (嫩江大橋) self-defense war" began, the national army had no controversy about " Right of self-defense ". Subsequent resistance was carried out under the legitimate defense concept of the Nanjing Nationalist Government.From a military point of view, the Nationalist government did not have a so-called "non-resistance policy." The argument that Chiang Kai-shek sent a telegram to encourage Ma Zhanshan's (馬占山) anti-Japanese war actions was equivalent to declaring an end to the non-resistance policy is not correct. It is not true that the Nationalist government's "non-resistance policy" was delayed until the "January 28th" Incident, too.