新產品開發包含組織內部複雜的互動與組織外部因素，是一個動態且充滿不 確定的過程。公營事業研發新產品，在創始期獨占利潤，亦引來模仿事業經由還 原複製、獨自複製等方式加入市場，分享利益。消費者對高度價格敏感性產品的 感受較深，而公營事業須兼顧消費者淨效益與事業利潤。本文延伸遊戲理論 （game theory），推導公營事業在產品創始期獨占市場，以及模仿者加入市場競 爭的產量、價格、利潤、對消費者淨效用及對社會福利之最佳決策。 研究結果得到：（1）政府補貼上限需視其價格敏感度而定，當產品的價格敏 感度高至四分之三時，每單位產品的效用至少要為其單位成本的百分之八十以上 才值得補貼，意即，每單位產品的補助上限應為單位成本的百分之二十；(2) 產 品效用與其單位成本差距越大，對社會福利貢獻越多；（3）產品效用與其單位成 本差距越大的高度價格敏感度產品，越需兼顧消費者淨效用的獨占公營事業提 供；（4）兼顧消費者淨效用與事業利潤之公營事業應促其成為足夠規模經濟之獨占事業。

It is a dynamical and uncertain process the new product development includes complicated interaction in organization and its outside factors. At the beginning of the public-owned enterprise get monopoly profit in to developed product but, there are imitators to enter into this market to share benefit by reverse engineering or independent discovery. Consumers are more affected by high price-sensitivity product. The public-owned enterprise must be considered consumers’ net utility and enterprise’s profits. This paper following game theory, formulates the high price-sensitivity product innovation optimal decision models of the profit, production quantity and price for the public-owned enterprise in monopoly and oligopoly market, and the imitators to enter into this market competition process. The results of this paper study are : (1) government subsidizes these public-owned enterprise should be depend on this product price sensitivity, the product utility must be over than 80% of unit cost, and means that 20% unit cost is the upper subsidizing limit at product price sensitivity is three fourths, (2) the product utility higher than unity cost, the more public welfare of the public-owned enterprise provide, (3) the product utility higher than unity cost, the more consumer’s net utility of the monopoly public-owned enterprise provide, and (4) the government must be push the public-owned enterprise to be a monopoly firm and has an economies of scale.