本文首先說明如何理解平等與不平等之間貌似不相容的關係。除 了平等自身的規範特性之外，由於平等還受正義理念所統籌，（實現） 平等與（容忍）不平等因而得以一致地共存於正義理論內。透過掌握 這項狀似矛盾的特殊屬性，我們能夠深刻地理解平等，正確持平地支 持平等價值。而藉由分析此狀似矛盾之貌，本文也得以解釋平等與多 元民主政治哲學或正義理論之間的兩重關係：第一、平等與多元民主 正義間狀似衝突之現象，乃符合實現多元民主之正義理念時所不可或 缺之價值多樣性。第二、平等理念為多元民主正義論中不可化約、必然認可的政治理念；唯有將矛盾現象視為狀似，多元民主正義才可能。

This essay first aims to explain why “inequality” in equality is plausible and their seeming incompatibility is comprehensible. That the incompatibility is merely superficial, rather than genuine, is due to a normative character of equality and its role as one but no exclusive value among others in a conception of justice. After making explicit the characteristics of equality with a standpoint of apparent incompatibility, I demonstrate how this vantage point of view allows us to see more clearly the relationship between the demand of equality and a conception of justice for a pluralistic democracy in the following two ways. First, the apparent incompatibility between equality and a demand of pluralistic democracy fits the requirement of diversity of values in achieving a pluralistic democracy; second, since equality is an irreducible value in a conception of justice for a pluralistic democracy, such a conception is only possible when the incompatibility is apparent.