本文分析《聯邦論》之中兩種不同取向的共和主義思想：其一為 憲政共和主義，通過代議制度及三權分立相互制衡等機制，來防止政 治人物濫權，而落實了「以野心對抗野心」的現代憲政科學；另一則 為民主共和主義，在三權分立的憲政主義之底層，潛存著在特殊的重 大時刻，真正落實「依賴人民是控制政府最基本的辦法」之民主共和 主義論述。本文進一步探討在制憲權理論層次結合憲政共和主義與民 主共和主義的兩種可能途徑：Bruce Ackerman以審議民主來減低人 民制憲的不穩定性，本文則通過對「授權性改革」的分析，指出「持 續性奠基」的另一種共和主義的理論進程。

This article analyzes two different republican orientations underlying The Federalist Papers. The first is constitutional republicanism，which develops representative government and separation of powers to realize modern constitutionalism. The other is democratic constitutionalism， which resorts to the people themselves during grave constitutional moments. This article further analyzes two possibilities to synthesize constitutional and democratic republicanisms on the level of constitution-making. Bruce Ackerman deploys deliberative democracy to reduce the uncertainties of populist democracy. Hannah Arendt， by contrast， provides the insight of “continuous founding” which has resonance in the idea of “authorized innovation” in The Federalist Papers.