仇恨言論是否該受管制、如何管制等等，向來是爭議不休的課 題。在當代西方思想界，德沃金是反對政府管制仇恨言論最力的論 者。他企圖從所謂的「平等尊重」原則，連同其對功效主義之批判， 原則性地證立「仇恨言論不該受到管制」。本文以仇恨言論相關課題 作為探討重心，針對德沃金的反管制論證及其理論基礎，進行分析與 批評。本文通過分析指出，儘管德沃金為言論自由（乃至表達自由） 提供了相當有力的辩護，但他仍未成功地證立「仇恨言論不該受到管 制」作為一種普遍原則。德沃金的論證足以說明：倘若我們認為「平 等尊重」是至關緊要的政治道德，則在絕大多數情況下，政府不應對 仇恨言論進行管制。然而，若以納粹屠殺猶太人作為前車之鑑，我們 勢必難以從原則上排除「某些極端的仇恨言論嚴重侵害了他人重要權 益」之可能。當這類權利（言論自由）與權利（其他基本權利）的衝 突發生時，我們仍須通過實質的價值權衡與經驗判斷，才能使反管制 的主張足具說服力。

Must hate speech not be regulated? In defending free speech，Ronald Dworkin stresses that any censorship on grounds of content is inconsistent with the liberal commitment to individual moral autonomy. He contends that restricting speech out of external preferences about the morally correct way for others to live，would violate their right to equal respect. Through a critical examination of these arguments， the present article aims to cast doubt on Dworkin’s forceful insistence that hate speech not be regulated. It is argued that the Dworkinian interpretation of equal respect， powerful though it is as a defense of free speech， could hardly be taken to override a priori all other important moral considerations. Historically speaking，and seen from a more empirically minded perspective， it is not inconceivable that certain extreme hate speech would seriously violate others’ basic rights. Dworkin’s argument from equal respect， however， could not in itself resolve that potential conflict of rights. To the extent that this defect could not be rectified on Dworkin’s account， his principled insistence that hate speech not be regulated remains questionable.