Ronald Dworkin法律哲學的核心主張「法律作為原則一貫性」 (Law as Integrity，又譯為「整全法」）向來被視為一種法律的融貫論 (a coherence theory of law)。對於Dworkin法律融貫論的主要挑戰之一是Joseph Raz的權威論據。Raz認為，Dworkin的原則一貫性理論無法說明法律的權威本質。Raz對於Dworkin的批評是否能夠成 立，以及Dworkin式的融貫論要如何回應權威論據的挑戰，是本文 所要探討的問題。本文首先歸納了 Dworkin法律融貫論的幾個主要 論點，其次討論Raz基於權威論據對於Dworkin融貫論的批評，除 了介紹Dworkin自己對此一批評的回應之外，我也嘗試提出其它的 論據（重構命題與正確衡量命題）來辯護Dworkin式的法律融貫 論。本文最後則簡單討論了融貫命題與法之概念（the concepts of law) 的關係。

The core tenet of Ronald Dworkin’s legal philosophy “Law as Integrity” is usually regarded as a coherence theory of law. One of the positivistic challenges to Dworkin’s coherence theory of law is Joseph Raz，s argument from authority. Raz claims that Dworkin’s theory of Law as Integrity cannot give a satisfactory account of the authoritative nature of law. The main issue of this essay is whether Raz’s criticism is justified and how to defend the Dworkinian coherence thesis against Raz’s attack. In this essay I will firstly summarize the main theses of Dworkin’s coherence theory and then discuss Raz’s authority-based arguments. Besides referring to Dworkin’s reply, I will propose my own arguments (the reconstruction thesis and the correct balance thesis) to show how a Dworkinian coherence theory can meet Raz’s challenge. The final part of this essay is a brief discussion about the relation between the coherence thesis and the concepts of law.