本文旨趣在闡釋德沃金所提出的人性尊嚴兩原則，嘗試解析其理 論意涵，並說明德沃金如何在實際的憲政辯論中應用這兩個原則。本 文認為，晚近德沃金所具體化的「內在價值」與「個人責任」兩條人 性尊嚴之原則，本質上是其「倫理個人主義」的進一步延伸與體現， 不僅是德沃金政治、道德與法律推論的共同根基，也是他自由主義法 政哲學的道德哲學基礎，展現了如同羅爾斯證成一套正義的道德理論 之雄心。換言之，人性尊嚴標誌著德沃金式正義原則的哲學特徵。經 由理論的詮釋與實踐的檢視，我們看到德沃金在開鑿議題時的哲學方 法之特色，但也看到了人性尊嚴原則的實用性格及其潛在的限制。

This article explores the theoretical meanings of “principles of human dignity” and their practice in constitution debates by Ronald Dworkin. I argue that the two principles of human dignity—the principle of intrinsic values and that of personal responsibility—are not only fundamental concretization of ethical individualism but also common ground of political, moral and legal reasoning of Dworkin. Furthermore, the two dimensions of human dignity are the core of Dworkin’s moral philosophy. They manifest Dworkin’s ambition to justify the moral theory of justice like John Rawls did. In other words, human dignity signifies the philosophy character of Dworkinian principles of justice. Finally, this article will illustrate the pragmatism and potential limits of “principles of human dignity”. From theory to practice, I will analyze the approach Dworkin adopted to interpret and reflect upon philosophical issues.