近年來，劍橋學派內部對於霍布斯的政治思想是否具有民主理論 元素之議題’起了重要論爭。本文之主旨，乃以Richard Tuck所指出 的早期與後期霍布斯思想之差異為基礎，深入分析霍布斯早期思想中 「基源民主」的理論結構。文中檢視霍布斯如何由「雜眾」與「自然 狀態」出發，重構政治共同體創造統一性的課題。筆者嘗試指出，霍 布斯早期思想的原創性，在於依循多數統治以及基源民主兩大主軸， 建構出民主式社會契約與人民主權，而與後期《利維坦》一書的授權 代表論大相逕庭。而後進一步探討民主多數決是否有壓迫少數的意 涵，並嘗試以「非支配」來詮釋霍布斯早期思想的理論精神。在《論 公民》一書中已經產生人民主權與君主制間之緊張性，本文也檢討了 其中的憲政意義。雖然霍布斯最終放棄了基源民主論述，但在影響史 的層次，它仍然是現代民主思想史不可或缺的一環。

This article explores the idea of “original democracy” in the early thought of Thomas Hobbes. Starting from the debate within the Cambridge School between Richard Tuck and Kinch Hoekstra, I side with Tuck and provide a systematic reconstruction of Hobbes’s arguments in The Elements of Law and De Cive. The originality of early Hobbes lies in the fact that he provided an innovative argument for majority rule as the only viable form of social contract. Hobbes started from the presumption of the popular sovereignty tradition and tried to rebutt it. This rhetoric strategy is not successful and results in an anti-monarchical perspective incompatible with Hobbes’s own political view. Consequently this argument was dropped in the Leviathan, and was replaced by the argument of representative authorization. Hobbes’s idea of original democracy, however, influenced the readers of De Ci^e, including Spinoza, Pufendorf, and Rousseau, and provides a missing link in the genealogy of modern democratic thought.