有關霍布斯《利維坦》的研究，長期以來一直被某種唯物主義的 閱讀方式所主導，但其結果，卻是忽略了霍布斯藉此經典所要傅達的 道德與政治意涵。本文試圖探索這些缺漏，並提出一個不同的詮釋架 構，來說明同時存在霍布斯著作中的兩個重要觀念，亦即原因與理 由。追隨歐克秀的觀點，作者認為，《利維坦》是一部藝術作品、一 個迷思，但非科學；霍布斯實際上是一位帶著幽暗之懷疑論信條的懷 疑論者；也因此，霍布斯從來沒有混淆基於科學推理的理性行為與源 於自願活動的道德行為之間的差異。為了更清楚地表明：霍布斯是一 位藉著意志賦予義務以新的基礎的道德哲學家，而非透過因果法則來 研究經驗世界的政治科學家，作者將引入學界晚近的研究成果，嘗試 把霍布斯放在所謂的「皮婁主義危機」之中，來做重新解讀。通過 以上的重建，作者同時希望能從不同的論述平台，來反思邊沁所謂的 「霍布斯悖論」：霍布斯究竟是一位「原初的自由主義者」，還是一位 「絕對的專制主義者」。

The study of Hobbes’s Leviathan has long been dominated by a materialistic reading, which deeply ignores the moral and political implications of the masterpiece that its author intended to deliver. The article explores these lacunae, seeking an alternative interpretation for grasping the ideas of cause and reason which seem to have coexisted in Hobbes’s writings. It is my view, following Oakeshott, that Leviathan is a “work of art”, a “myth”, not science, that Hobbes was a ferocious sceptic with a “darkly sceptical doctrine”, and consequently that Hobbes never confused the rational conduct based on scientific reasoning with the moral conduct arising from the activity of willing. In order to make the case that Hobbes is better understood as a moral philosopher, establishing a new foundation of obligation in terms of volition, rather than a political scientist, explaining the empirical world according to causality, I will try to re-place Hobbes into the very context of crise Pyrrhonienne. All this, I hope, may help us arrive at a different point to reconsider the “paradoxes of Hobbes”，to use Bentham’s famous phrase, namely, whether Hobbes is a proto-liberal or an absolutist.