本文之目的，在於從Hans Kelsen規範理論的角度，對於不確定 法律概念（unbestimmter Rechtsbegriff)在德國行政法釋義學上的發
展傅統與功能定位，提出根本性的檢討，藉此在澄清不確定法律概念 所體現的「一般性」特質之餘，進一步指出不確定法律概念如何發揮 它拘束行政決定的功能。首先，本文將先從法學方法論的觀點，闡述 Kelsen如何理解與詮釋法律的「框架（Rahmen)」性格，又如何在此 「框架」觀點之下，突破傅統法學方法論對於法律內容「先決性」之 預設，主張「法律授權」與「法律拘束」彼此間一體兩面的關係。 據此，本文將藉助Kelsen的觀點，說明不確定法律概念的釋義學建 構，如何在傅統「先決性」的預設之下受到扭曲，並藉此反省：不 確定法律概念應如何協助鞏固行政決定的合法性。透過這些分析，本 文將嘗試指出：若根據Kelsen的規範框架觀點，不確定法律概念並 不是對法治國的威脅，也不應該在法律內容先決性的預設之下，被歸 類為法律明確性原則的例外狀態。在國家任務日趨複雜與多樣的發展 趨勢之下，不確定法律概念不但象徵一種當代法律管制模式的常態， 甚且還足以構成一種調控複雜行政行為的特殊拘束類型。就此意義而 言，不確定法律概念拘束功能的發揮，反而恰恰繫於它的「不確定 性」。

Many German scholars in the 20th century have shared the classic viewpoint that the law must somehow be pre-determined (vorausbestimmt) in order to be able to bind the power of law application. Against this presupposition of “pre-determination”, Hans Kelsen’s “Pure Theory of Law” emphasized the necessary incompleteness of the law and thereby the necessary “distance” between the higher and the lower legal norms. While Kelsen regarded this incompleteness as a legal delegation to a concrete law-making through the administrative power and the judiciary, however, he never argued for an unbounded or even arbitrary administrative or judicial lawmaking. On the contrary, he maintained that the binding force of the law must be based exactly on its delegation to administrative as well as judicial concretization & lawmaking. This essay hereby purports to reexamine the binding function of the so-called “uncertain legal concepts (unbestimmter Rechtsbegriff)” in German administrative law from the perspective of Kelsen’s normative theory. Unlike the familiar viewpoint that only certain legal rules are capable of regulating the administrative power, this essay intends to clarify how a harmonized relationship between uncertain legal concepts and the binding force of law should be built in context of the German administrative law.