當代審議民主運動所設定的兩個主要目標：政策共識與包容多元 的公民文化，可說是分別延續了西方智識主義的兩大傅統：柏拉圖的 知識建構與蘇格拉底的自我探究。但是，深受智識主義影響的審議民 主理論不能適當處理政治信任這個根本的政治議題。知識不能解決信 任問題，因為信任本是在沒有充分知識的困境中所做的決定。本文以 柏拉圖《政治家篇》('the Statesman )為討論文本，嘗試建構一個以信 任問題為核心的審議民主理論。結果顯示，這項審議民主理論包含了 三個基進的原則：人民的全面參與、法條至上，與反智識主義。這三 項原則與當代主流的民主理論大異其趣，正好引領我們重新思考民 主、法律與知識三者之間的關連。

This paper presents a theory of deliberative democracy drawing on the discussion of political trust in Plato’ s Statesman. The main theories of deliberative democracy that we have seen so far are arguably the offspring of two intellectualist ideas; one is the idea of Platonic knowledge while the other is the Socratic pursuit of self-understanding. However, such intellectualism provides little help in the discussion of political trust, an important issue especially in new democracies. Knowledge is no solution to the problem of political trust, since trust, by definition, is decision made when sufficient knowledge is unavailable. Which will we trust, the expert’ s personal instruction or the letter of the law? How can our trust not be betrayed? We have found three radical principles of deliberative democracy in the Statesman: popular participation, legalism and anti-intellectualism. These principles, in sharp contrast to today’ s mainstream political values, shed new light on our discussion of democracy, law and knowledge.