本文嘗試從理論背景思考一個引發許多爭議的微小但卻核心的問 題：為什麼羅爾斯不認同博格將差異原則應用在全球正義中？
本文將論述，首先，博格對羅爾斯的「民族」的理解是有根本 錯誤的。這導致博格誤認為羅爾斯的萬民法社會是一種以「國家」 (state)為主體的國際正義社會’而加以批判；其次’原初狀態之設 計不可以直接應用在國際社會中，而是必須間接的應用，博格的全球 原初狀態之原型構想只能是一種更加難以實現的鳥托邦；第三，雖 然博格和羅爾斯都表明受到《論永久和平》（Zum ewigen Frieden )的 啟發，但是，他們兩人卻得出了完全不同的論證結果。本文將指出， 博格是過度應用了康德的理念；最後，也是最重要的，在博格的全球 正義理論中佔據最核心地位的分配正義觀（也是其人權內容的最要 項），其基本想法，其實是一項現實基礎薄弱的經濟鳥托邦，而羅爾 斯的援助義務觀則具有較高的實現可能性。
本文因此認為，博格的全球正義理論徹徹底底是一種以自由主義 個人權利為基礎的分配正義觀，或許可以促使自由主義國家對窮國進 行某種程度的補償，但是，對於全球和平來說，卻不會是一種被非自 由主義社會所樂於接受的正義觀。

This paper considers a vital question that causes lots of controversy: Why doesn’t Rawls approve Pogge’s application of the difference principle to global justice? Four topics are addressed. First, Pogge’s understanding of Rawls’s idea of “nation” is ultimately wrong, which leads Pogge to mistake Rawls’s “society of the law of peoples” for a society of international justice and criticize it accordingly. Second, the original position is designed to be applied indirectly rather than directly to the international society, so Pogge’s design of the global original position is only a Utopia that’s even more difficult to realize. Third, while they both claim to be inspired by Perpetual Peace, Pogge and Rawls deduce completely different arguments. We pointed out Pogge’s argument is an over-application of Kant’s idea. Last, but not least, as the core of Pogge’s theory of global justice as well as the first and foremost topic in his content of human rights, the conception of distributive justice is basically a hardly realizable economic Utopia. On the other hand, Rawls’s conception of the duty of assistance has more practical potential. Therefore, Pogge’s theory of global justice is a conception of distributive justice that’s
founded on the individual rights of liberalism. Such a theory could perhaps
make the liberal states compensate the poor states to a certain extent. However, in terms of global peace, Pogge’s conception of justice is not what the non-liberal states would accept.