本文打算藉亞理斯多德之道德教養理論，來討論我們該如何為品 性（德性、惡習）負責的問題。事實上，品性責任與道德教養，在亞 理斯多德倫理學中其實是不能獨立地被處理的議題，因為，他對於道 德教養的基本看法，對如何解釋我們該為品性（尤其是惡習）負責， 乃是潛藏的威脅：按照《尼各馬科倫理學》說法，我們品性養成的主 要階段是孩童期一基於孩童時期的習惯與教養。但如此一來，品性 責任便欠缺了論證基礎，因為在孩童時期，我們並無法掌控影響我們 品性的因素；因此，若我們在離開孩童時期時已經養成一些牢固的惡 習，那麼這應歸咎於幼年時的習惯與道德灌輸，而不是自已。
本文打算藉由一種「兩階段式」的品性教養理論，來解決上述這 個困難。本文打算論述，亞理斯多德固然極為重視幼年時期德性教養 的重要性，但他基本上仍是將品性養成的關鍵時期放在成年。此外， 本文將指出，解釋惡習責任之困難，可以藉由類似解釋疏失的責任問 題加以解決。

This article discusses Aristotle’s theory of responsibility for character on the basis of his idea about moral habituation. In fact, responsibility for character and moral habituation are the topics which cannot be separately considered in Aristotle’s ethics, for his conception of moral habituation is potentially a threat for his theory of responsibility for character: As the Nicomachean Ethics indicates, our states of character are formed mainly in our childhood, by our early education and habituation. However, if this is so, then the responsibility for character will be deprived of any justification, for we are not in control of the factors that influence our character development right from birth; our early educators are responsible for and in control of that. But then the patterns of habitual activity productive of our states of character would be already well entrenched in our dispositions by the time we emerge from the care of our early moral educators, and so it would be unreasonable to claim that it is up to us to develop the states of character we do.
In order to resolve this difficulty in Aristotle’s conception of responsibility for character, this article attempts to argue that according to Aristotle, the habituation we receive from our early moral education is insufficient to determine our states of character; in his view, our states of character are formed both during the early stage of moral education and the adult age. For Aristotle, namely, the adult habituation is as much decisive for the character development as the early one. Moreover, this
article will indicate that the difficulties as to the interpretation of the
responsibility for vices can be resolved in a way analogous to that in which we answer the question of how to explain the responsibility for negligence.