女性主義者德渥金（Andrea Dworkin)及麥肯能（Catharine MacKinnon)曾起草一部反色情法規（本文稱為德渥金一麥肯能法 規），其中把色情刊物定義為「經由圖像或文字，以性圖像的方式公 然使得婦女遭到臣屬」，並據此主張查禁色情刊物。對該等主張，女 性主義者維塔（Melinda Vadas )認為言之成理並加以辯護。本文則 將針對維塔的辯護進行詳細檢驗，並將主張：德渥金一麥肯能法規對 色情刊物的定義並無法推論出「查禁色情刊物」的結論。此外，本文 還將主張：為了使得婦女不會因為色情刊物而遭到臣屬，訴諸「勸 服」（persuasion)或「用更多言論與之對抗」（fight speech with more speech)策略’實較「強制」（coercion)或「查禁」（censorship)策略 更站得住腳。

Feminists Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon propose a definition of “pornography” (henceforth D-M definition) which construes pornography as contributing to the creation of women as a subordinated people. Melinda Vadas attempts to show that D-M definition is logically defensible. The aim of this paper is to examine Vadas’s defense of D-M definition. My paper divides into two parts. In the first section I will argue that Vadas offers no support for the thesis that pornography can subordinate women. Consequently we have as yet no reason to accept D-M definition and Vadas’s account of the wrongness of producing or disseminating pornography. In the second section I will consider whether pornography that subordinates should be restricted by law. I will argue that it does not immediately follow from D-M definition that censorship is the best answer. What follows is that there is a conflict between liberty and equality. One possible response to this conflict might be to fight for equality in ways compatible with respecting the liberty of pornographers. But what Vadas has said leaves open that possibility.