本文以德沃金晚近的法哲學理論為研究對象，嘗試對其理論的道 德基礎，即從合法性、平等到人性尊嚴三個政治道德價值，進行分析 考察與檢討反省。第二節介紹德沃金近來對法律的概念提出的類型區 分，分析合法性價值作為法律之重要政治道德價值的理論意涵；第三 節考察德沃金合法性價值觀的實質內涵’即整全性（integrity)與平 等（equality)的政治道德價值；第四節進一步探討，德沃金以合法 性、整全性及平等作為其法哲學理論的道德基礎，實際上是立基於一 個更根本、但也饒富爭議的論述上，亦即他對於「人性尊嚴原則」的 論述；第五節審視人性尊嚴原則在德沃金法哲學理論的關鍵地位，並 檢討該論述所衍生出來的關於人是否有內在客觀價值的哲學爭議，同 時提出一些初步的檢討與省思；最後，第六節除簡要總結本文論點 外，也將概述德沃金對法律與道德之關係的最終看法。

This essay attempts to explore and reflect the moral foundation of Ronald Dworkin’s legal philosophy, that is, the political moral values from legality, equality to human dignity. Part 2 will introduce Dworkin’s recent argument about different concepts of law and analyze the theoretical implication that treats legality as an important political moral value of law. Part 3 examines the substantive content of legality, i.e., the political moralities of integrity and equality. Part 4 argues that, the moral foundation of Dworkin’s legal philosophy not only lies in the values of legality, integrity, and equality, it is also grounded on a more fundamental but controversial argument, namely, the argument about the principles of human dignity. Accordingly, Part 5 will further investigate the philosophical debate derived from the argument of human dignity. It is the debate about whether each person has an intrinsic value of life. Finally, Part 6 will briefly summarize the points of this essay and generally sketch Dworkin’s concluding claim about the relation of law and morality.