阿瑪蒂亞•森在過去30多年來提出並辯護了可行能力方法，並 在近年來提出一種新的正義觀以替代羅爾斯的正義理論。本文旨在批 評地考察森的正義觀，文章分兩部分，第一部分檢視森的正義觀之 「質料」，即可行能力方法中的核心概念，論證其可行能力概念和實 質自由概念過於模糊和不確定無法為一個正義概念提供公共標準和明 確內涵。第二部分檢視森的正義觀之「形式」，即森的正義的比較方 法，論證森對先驗方法和制度主義的批評並不令人信服，比較方法 並未提供對羅爾斯正義理論的範式轉換，也非更好的替代方法。「質 料」之模糊與「形式」之缺陷使得森的正義觀需要進一步發展，否則 無法得到證成。

For the past 30 years, Amartya Sen has been arguing for a version of the capabilities approach as an alternative approach to Rawls’ theory of justice. More recently, he proposes a so-called-comparative approach to social justice to depart from what he calls the transcendental approach. This paper gives a critical view of Sen’s idea of justice. On the one hand, the core concepts in his version of the capabilities approach are extremely vague and indeterminate. He fails to provide a criterion to distinguish between valuable and trivial capabilities from the point of view of justice. His conception of freedom is too intrusive and cannot be a useful concept to develop an approach to social justice. On the other, he fails to provide a convincing argument against what he calls “transcendental approach” in that he is not clear about what transcendental means. He also fails to make a good case for the focus on people’s behavioural patterns. So this paper concludes that his idea of justice need to be further developed in order to be justified.