獨立機關是當代民主國家進行政府改造時所廣泛採用的制度選擇，以因應國家角色與政府職能的轉變，並產生特殊的政策影響。本文首先應用授權理論研究途徑分析民主國家的立法機關創建獨立機關的理由與運作；再討論美國的總統制民主政體與歐洲的內閣制民主政體之中，立法機關授權獨立機關的制度定位，並探討獨立機關的獨立性與課責性的意義與發展。在分析當代西方民主國家獨立機關的理論與實際之後，本文討論我國政權輪替之後獨立機關的發展與性質，顯示與當代民主國家的獨立機關不盡相同。在結論之中，本文分析在我國特殊歷史脈絡與政經社文系絡之中，半總統制的獨立機關運作所形成的問題，並為將來的政策制定者提出建言。

The independent agency is the widely accepted institutional choice when a modern democratic state reinventing its government, in order to cope with the transition in the roles played by the state and the functions of the government, and to make impact on the policies. In this paper, the approach derived from the delegation theory would be firstly used to analyze the reasons and operation of the legislative branches of democratic states create independent agencies; then this paper would discuss the presidential democracy of the U.S.A and the parliamentary democracies of Europe, the characters of legislative branches to delegate authority to independent agencies, and to explore the implication and development n the independence and accountability of independent agencies. After analyzing the creations and characters of independent agencies of contemporary western democratic states, in this paper, the development and special features of independent agencies after the turnover of government in Taiwan would be discussed, which showed the differences between independent agencies of Taiwan and those of contemporary democratic states. In conclusion, this paper has tried to analyze that under the special historical context and socio-economical-political and cultural background, the problems derived from the operation of independent agencies under the semi-presidentialism in Taiwan, and made suggestions to the policy makers in the future.